Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development Decisions: A Waste of Effort? by Janmaat, Johannus A.
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Stakeholder Engagement in Land
Development Decisions: A Waste of
Effort?
Johannus A. Janmaat
University of British Columbia Okanagan
6. December 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6147/
MPRA Paper No. 6147, posted 7. December 2007 00:25 UTC
Stakeholder Engagement in Land Development
Deisions: A Waste of Eort?
John Janmaat
∗
Eonomis, IK Barber Shool of Arts and Sienes
University of British Columbia Okanagan
john.janmaatub.a
Deember 6, 2007
Abstrat
Currently, management devolution and engagement of loal stakehold-
ers - expeted to have better information - is seen as key to eetive
environmental management. Often, the absene of lear property rights
and/or supporting market institutions leaves management deisions to a
politial proess. Where undeveloped land provides a publi good, when
to halt further development is modelled as a repeated lobbying ontest
between industry and households. Lobbying eort aets the ontinua-
tion probability. Depending on how stakeholders are engaged, there may
be little impat on nal outomes, or a lobbying war an be stimulated.
Overall welfare is seldom enhaned.
Keywords: Stakeholder engagement, lobbying ontest, publi good, water
onservation, land development
JEL: Q24, Q25, R14, R52
1 Introdution
Power to the people is a mantra that has beome an important theme in the
environmental movement. A range of books and artiles, ([33, 36℄ for example)
argue that loal environmental stewardship is the means by whih our environ-
mental problems must be addressed. Both governmental and non-governmental
organizations are often strongly promoting suh approahes, while ritial anal-
ysis of these approahes are sare, and are so far at best inonlusive about
∗
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the outomes. An area where this argument is partiularly strongly presented
is land use planning. Often, planning involves deiding whether or not a parel
of open spae is going to be developed. Development an diretly onsume a re-
soure that produes a loal publi good, suh as open spae, or more indiretly,
suh as leading to hanged ows in loal streams. In this paper a situation loser
to the latter is modelled. A regulator retains nal authority over whether or not
to allow further development, while a pro- and anti-development lobby attempt
to inuene when development will be halted.
Although onsumption of open spae by development is probably the most
publiized impat of sprawl, it is not obvious that substitution of a landsaped
suburban yard for an agriultural eld is destrution of a publi good. In on-
trast, where development onsumes water that would otherwise maintain stream
ows, the destrution of the publi good is more apparent. We fous on this
type of situation here. Some eorts have been made to value instream ows
(examples inlude [9, 12, 11, 28℄), often using ontingent valuation. A general
result of all this literature is that below a ertain level, redutions in stream
ow redue the publi good value of the stream. This type of publi good is the
fous of the urrent analysis.
Another branh of literature examines mehanisms that an be used to seure
instream ows ([17, 6, 32, 16, 8℄ among others), while [25℄ douments a few ases
where inentive based approahes have been atually applied. Game theoreti
approahes in this literature have largely been restrited to bargaining models,
where at least one dimension of the bargaining inludes instream ows [1, 38, 7℄.
Dynamis are generally restrited to elements of the physial proesses. These
models are mostly built to inform poliy makers, rather than analyzing the
proess itself.
Although enabling or foring stakeholders to diretly engage eah other is
relatively novel, stakeholders have traditionally been involved in water negotia-
tion proesses. Their eetiveness at promoting their interests is related to their
eort, suintly ommented on by [29, p343℄ ... only those with suiently
onentrated osts or benets, who attend hearings and ommittee meetings or
make large ampaign ontributions will be heard. As Loomis argues, valuation
studies are one way to measure the impats on those not ative in the proess.
However, many argue that engagement is preferable to valuation studies. Par-
tiipation should therefore be made less ostly, or failure to partiipate made
more ostly. `Stakeholder engagement', 'partiipatory management,' and other
suh approahes are perhaps best interpreted as eorts to hange the osts and
benets of involvement in the deision proess. The results of the rather limited
analysis of suh approahes is mixed [3, 26, 42, 23, 30, 39℄. Partiipants express
a greater appreiation for others' situation, and suggest they are more willing
to ooperate. However, there is little evidene of behaviour hange, and some
suggestion that people engage in the proess to delay regulatory hange, rather
than to partiipate in shaping that hange. In the model below, two aspets
of the partiipation proess are onsidered, the eetiveness of lobbying eort
and the responsiveness of the regulator to that eort. Greater eetiveness and
responsiveness are akin to inreasing the potential benet of partiipation to
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the stakeholders.
The relationship between households and developers has been explored. Fis-
hel [13, 14℄ argues that loal politis is heavily inuened by 'homevoters' who
partiipate out of fear that the value of their most important asset, their home,
may derease. Henderson and Beker [19℄ reviews a number of models of ity
development, and deides that the most appropriate has ities rst built by
development rms and then turned over to a government. Managing develop-
ment to maximize itizen welfare only happens after there are itizens present.
Lubell et al. [31℄ disusses several models, partiularly the ontrast between a
property rights model - where sarity drives a demand for property rights over
that whih is sare - against interest group models - the 'Growth Mahine' -
and the politial market - where interests try to buy the regulator. Suess
in ahieving onservation objetives depends on both the power of the interest
groups and the institutional form. As evidene, onservation is generally less
where developers are the most powerful, while it is greatest where population
pressures are higher.
Muh researh has looked at the role of lobbying in government deision-
making. In what follows we fous on a partiular stream of this literature, the
rent seeking ontest model started by Tullok [40, 41℄. Tullok is redited with
being the rst to oneptualize lobbying as investing to aet the probability
of apturing a prize. In the stati ase with Tullok's speiation, the Nash
equilibrium always involves wasteful spending on lobbying. Linster [27℄ showed
that when the ontest is innitely repeated, this need not be true. Dijkstra [10℄
found that interest groups may prefer regulation over a nanial instrument
if lobbying over use of revenues exhausts potential payouts. Graihen et al.
[15℄ showed that it may be optimal for rms to improve their environmental
behaviour if it redues the likelihood that an environmental lobby an beome
a substitute. Ironially, environmental and onsumer lobbies may be working
in opposite diretions in suh situations. This paper implements a Tullok
style lobbying game in a dynami land development ontext, where development
onsumes a publi good, akin to instream ow.
2 Model
We onsider a model where ommunity members - households - and rms both
an partiipate in a negotiation or lobbying proess. Partiipation is ostly to
both households and rms. Although the terms 'lobbying' and 'negotiation'
have almost ontraditory normative onnotations, for our purposes the key
issue is that engagement is ostly, but engagement does inuene outomes.
The terms will therefore be used somewhat interhangeably. The negotiation is
over whether or not to allow more of a sare resoure essential for ommunity
growth - land or instream water - to be developed. Undeveloped, the sare
resoure produes a publi good. When used, this developed land provides
aommodation for members of the ommunity. Thus, development inreases
the size of the ommunity, and thereby the marginal publi good value of further
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onsumption of the resoure.
To be spei, let w be the total amount of the resoure that an be devel-
oped, zt the amount left undeveloped at t, and qt (qit for eah rm) the amount
that is developed in t. The publi good and population are both normalized to
the same units as zt, so that at the beginning of a period, population is w− zt.
Development ours at the beginning of the period, after whih the publi good
is enjoyed. Thus, the population in period t, after qt units of land are devel-
oped, is w − (zt − qt). This is the population able to enjoy the publi good in
that period, and will be labelled mt when this is onvenient. At the end of the
period, rms hoose an amount xit to devote to the negotiation proess, and
households hoose an amount yjt. The regulator's deision proess is probabilis-
ti, as in a Tullok game, with the probability of a halt in further development
given by pi(xt, yt), with xt and yt being the total negotiation eort for rms and
households. It is assumed that pi1 < 0 and pi2 > 0, where subsripts indiate
partial derivative arguments. One development of the resoure stops, it never
resumes.
There are n idential rms, with period prot given by
pt(mt)qit − ct(qit)− xit (1)
where pt() is the prie that a unit of the resoure ommands and ct(qt) is the ost
to the rm of developing qt units. The demand urve satises p
′
t < 0 and p
′′
t ≥ 0,
while the ost funtion satises c′t > 0 and c
′′
t > 0. The resoure is durable, in
that eah onsumer only onsumes one unit, whih provides indenite servie.
Demand therefore depends on total development (population,mt = w−(zt−qt)),
not period development (immigration, qt). This is onsistent with land, or
annual rights to a nite renewable resoure like water. For eah household,
period utility is given by
u(zt, Yi − yit) (2)
where Yi is an exogenously given inome for household i. Standard assumptions
are satised, with u1 > 0, u11 < 0, u2 > 0 and u22 < 0. Note that this is the
utility of a resident who owns a house, with the prie paid for the house treated as
a sunk ost. For simpliity, the demand for houses is assumed to be independent
of the level of the loal publi good supplied by undeveloped land. House prie
and the utility of residents is therefore independent - we are onerned with
utility of residents after purhasing a house. A visual representation of the
game is shown in gure 1.
Determining the optimal development path and stopping point requires a-
ounting for rm prots and household utility. If prots of the development
industry leave the ommunity, so that aounting for them onsists of ignoring
them, then the optimal ommunity size and publi good level are found, for any
initial zt, by solving
[β/(1− β)] max
qt
{u(zt − qt, Yi)mt} (3)
the present value of an annuity generating u(zt − qt, Yi)mt aggregate utility
indenitely, with disount fator β. The rst order ondition is u1 = u/mt,
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0 ≤ xt ≤ Rt − Ct
xt
0 ≤ qt ≤ zt
qt
yt
0 ≤ yt ≤ Yi
1− pit
pit[
T∑
t=0
βt(Rt − Ct − xt),
T∑
t=0
βtUt +
βT+1
1− β
UT
]
Figure 1: Game Tree. Firm payo when the game ends is the present value
of prots from house sales, less lobbying ost, to the point where development
ends. For households, payo is the present value of the utility stream earned
while development ours, and the present value of the permanent level of utility
earned after development stops.
or marginal utility equals average utility. Thus, not surprisingly, the optimal
ommunity size is that whih maximizes average utility. The dynami nature
of the problem is irrelevant, as the driver for an optimal path over time is the
ost funtion. This is borne by the rms, and therefore ignored in this ase.
The utility maximizing solution is to simply set the ommunity at its optimal
size immediately. The only dependene on the urrent level of development, zt,
is that if zt is smaller than the optimal undeveloped resoure level, no further
development ours.
The polar opposite is to onsider only rm prots and ignore household
utility. We are then foused only on the rm, whih seeks to maximize the
present value of prots from development. In the form of a reursive relationship,
the value of a rm is
Vt(zt) = max
q
{pt(w − (zt − qt))qit − ct(qit) + (1 − pi)βVt+1(zt − qt)} (4)
where pi is an exogenous probability that further development will not be permit-
ted after the urrent period. In period t, the equilibrium (assuming symmetri
rms) ondition is
(qt/n)p
′
t + pt − c
′
t = (1− pi)βV
′
t+1 (5)
Firms equate the marginal benet of urrent development to the disounted
expeted marginal benet of delay. Inreasing the number of rms generates
more development in t (reall that p′t < 0).
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A soial optimum that onsiders both households and rms must ombine
utility and prots. If we let rms be owned by households, and, in the spirit of
the Hartwik rule [18℄, prots an be invested to generate a payo in perpetuity
(no depreiation), a third optimization an be performed. Following Bellman's
priniple of optimality [4℄, and assuming that all prots are distributed equally
among households, the reursive equation that haraterizes the optimal path
is
U(kt, zt) = max
qt
{u(zt − qt, Yi + (1− β)kt/mt)mt + βU(kt+1, zt+1)} (6)
where zt+1 = zt− qt, and kt+1 = pt(mt)qt− ct(qt)+ kt. The new state variable,
kt, is the aumulated prot from development ativities, whih generates a
return at (1 − β) that is shared equally among the population mt. The rst
order ondition is
ut − u1,tmt − (1 − β)(kt/mt)u2,t = β(p
′
tqt + pt − c
′
t)U1,t+1 − βU2,t+1 (7)
where with two subsripts, the rst indiates argument of derivative and the
seond the time period at whih the arguments are evaluated. The marginal
benet of inreasing development in period t is the utility earned by the addition
to the population, less the publi good loss and apital dilution impats. This
is set equal to the present value of the marginal benet of delay, whih inludes
the impats of the higher prie and prot next period and the greater level of
the publi good.
Introduing lobbying or negotiation demands that households and rms be
onsidered simultaneously. Further, if either type of agent is to lobby, there
must be a benet to doing so. Here, this is the impat on the probability
development stops after the urrent period, pi(xt, yt), where xt =
∑
xit and
yt =
∑
yjt are the total lobbying eorts of the households and rms. The two
reursive equations that haraterize this system are
V (zt) = max
qit,xit
{pt(w − (zt − qt))qit − ct(qit)− xit
+(1− pi(xt, yt))βV (zt − qt)} (8)
U(zt) = max
yjt
{u(zt − qt, Yj − yjt)
+pi(xt, yt)β
2/(1− β)u(zt − qt, Yj) + (1− pi(xt, yt))βU(zt − qt)
}
(9)
Two key points are highlighted in these reursive relationships. First, if develop-
ment stops, then the rm earns no further prots. Seond, for the household, if
development stops, households earn the present value of u(zt − qt, Yj), a onse-
quene of the fat that the publi good level remains at zt− qt forever, and that
no further spending on negotiation is required. The annuity fator is β/(1−β).
Some basi results of this formulation an be explored by examining the
rst order onditions. The rst order onditions for xit and yjt dene the best
response funtions of the two types of players. These are
−1− pi1,tβVt+1 = 0 (10)
−u2,t + pi2,tβ [β/(1− β)ut − Ut+1] = 0 (11)
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For the rms, the marginal probability saled next period value is equated with
the marginal lobbing ost, 1. For households, urrent marginal utility loss is
equated to marginal probability saled net benet if development stops, the
dierene between ut = u(zt − qt, Yi) and U(zt − qt). A lobbying war ours
when the resultant xt and yt values are larger than the hange in welfare relative
to the equilibrium that would our without lobbying.
For both types of agents, two fores interat to inuene whether and how
muh it is worth engaging in negotiations. For rms, these are the size of Vt+1
and the marginal impat on the probability. If the rm value is large, then
the value of negotiating to allow further development is high. Likewise, if the
impat on the probability is large, then the value of negotiating is high. With
housing a durable good, it follows that V ′t+1 < 0. As more housing is sold, the
prie of housing, and therefore future prots, falls. This implies that industry
lobbying eort will deline over time, as the stok of housing grows (as the stok
of the publi good shrinks).
For households, the marginal impat on pi interats with the expeted utility
impat of future development, β/(1 − β)ut − Ut+1. A greater probability im-
pat, the more it is worth spending. Likewise, the greater the expeted utility
impat - due to future redutions in the publi good, the more eort put into
negotiations. Therefore, if the publi good has diminishing marginal value to
households, then household lobbing eort will inrease over time, as the amount
of remaining publi good shrinks. Taken together, this implies that as the game
proeeds, industry lobbying delines and household lobbying inreases. Thus,
the probability that the game ends after the urrent period inreases with time.
The end of period lobbying game Nash equilibrium generates two funtions
x∗t (qt) and y
∗
t (qt). Assuming perfet information, these funtions are inluded
in the rms hoie of qt at the beginning of the period. The rst order ondition
for this optimization leads to the equilibrium ondition
p′tqt/n+ p− c
′
t︸ ︷︷ ︸ − x
∗′
t /n︸ ︷︷ ︸ = (1− pi)βV
′
t+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ (pi1x
∗′
t + pi2y
∗′
t )βVt+1︸ ︷︷ ︸
MNR ML MFC MLI
(12)
with symmetry assumed. The four omponents of this relation are here labelled
marginal net revenue (MNR), marginal lobbying (ML), marginal future ost
(MFC) and marginal lobbying impat (MLI). With a probability pi that devel-
opment will end after the urrent period, and no lobbying game, qt ours where
MNR = MFC. How this outome is shifted by the lobbying game depends on
how ML and MLI interat. This depends on the behaviour of x∗t and y
∗
t , and
how that interats with pi, where pi1 < 0 and pi2 > 0.
Sine both x∗t and y
∗
t an be either dereasing or inreasing, there are four
possible ombinations (see table 1). Absent the MLI eets, when x∗′t > 0, qt
is redued, as rms redue development to redue the resulting lobbying ost.
WhenMLI is positive, whih ours for a suiently large and positive y∗′t , this
eet is enhaned. Development, qt falls as rms are seeking to avoid engaging
in a lobbying war, rms 'fold'. For all remaining values of y∗′t , MLI is negative,
and qt is inreased. For large and negative values of y
∗′
t , the inrease in qt auses
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Table 1: Negotiating Game Equilibria. Households (H) hoose y and rms (F)
hoose x. In equilibria, either households or rms fold, or the system moves in
the diretion of a lobbying war. Within two ells, the outome is indeterminate
as it depends on the preise relationships, not simply the signs.
y∗′t ≪ 0 y
∗′
t < 0 y
∗′
t > 0 y
∗′
t ≫ 0
x∗′t < 0 qt ↑, H fold qt ↓, to war qt ↓, indet. qt ↓, F fold
x∗′t > 0 qt ↑, H fold qt ↑, indet qt ↑, to war qt ↓, F fold
a larger drop in y∗t than the inrease in x
∗
t , essentially households 'fold'. When
y∗′t is small in absolute value, inreasing qt may move the system in the diretion
of a lobbing war. This is ertain for y∗′t > 0, and an also be said to our if
y∗′t < 0 but x
∗′
t + y
∗′
t > 0. The hoie of qt indues an inrease in total lobbying
eort. Note that sine these are marginal eets, whether rms and households
are atually engaged in a wasteful lobbing war annot be determined from the
signs alone.
When x∗′t < 0, and no MLI, then rms inrease urrent development in
order to redue lobbying expenditures. With MLI negative, this eet is en-
haned. This ours when y∗′t is negative and large enough (in absolute value).
One again, households fold. Likewise, when y∗′t is large and positive, qt is re-
dued. Lobbying eort by rms does inrease, but the deline in qt is suiently
satisfying to the households that total lobbying falls, and we again say that rms
fold. With intermediate values for y∗′t , qt falls and industry lobbing inreases.
When y∗′t < 0, household lobbing also inreases, and the system moves in the
diretion of a lobbying water. With y∗′t > 0, whether or not the system moves
towards a lobbying war depends on whether x∗′t + y
∗′
t < 0.
A key poliy question is whether government has a role. At present, the
role is often seen as failitating negotiation by bringing stakeholders together.
It is unlear whether suh failitation aets pi(xt, yt). It is likely to redue the
ost of partiipation for the stakeholders, whih, all other things equal, would
inrease stakeholder resoures devoted to negotiation. In so far as this inrease
in resoures does not hange the outome, suh eorts are doubly wasteful. At
the rst level, government resoures are devoted to a proess that aomplishes
nothing. At the seond level, these government resoures leverage stakeholder
resoures, whih again aomplish nothing.
Thus, this suggests that government should not be devoting resoures to
failitating the negotiation proess. Rather, resoures should be direted at un-
derstanding the relative strength in the urrent proess, and looking for ways to
shift that balane whih inreases the likelihood of inreasing aggregate welfare.
The objetive therefore is to hange pi(xt, yt). This may involve funding tar-
geted at strengthening ommunity groups - the household lobby in the model.
Funding should diretly address where the weakness is in the household inu-
ene on pi(xt, yt) - overoming the free rider problem, supporting loal researh,
providing expertise, et. Unfortunately, it is expeted that any suh shifts would
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themselves be subjet to some level of politial negotiation.
3 Numerial Example
A numerial example is developed in R [34℄. Funtion denitions are
ut(yjt, zt) = Az
α
t (Yj − yjt)
β
(13)
pi(xt, yt) =
ayyt + bx
(axxt + bx) + (ayyt + by)
(14)
pt(qt, zt) = B(w − (zt − qt))
γ
(15)
C(qit) = Cn
δ−1qδit (16)
with all parameters exept γ assumed positive, and for diminishing marginal
utility, 0 < α, β < 1. Equation 14 is a ontest suess funtion frequently
used for lobbying games, military ontests, and similar situations. It is gener-
ally attributed to Tullok [40, 41℄, with two dierent axiomization presented in
Kooreman and Shoonbeek [24℄ and in Skaperdas [37℄. The ost funtion de-
nition, equation 16, has a saling fator dependent on n. With this adjustment,
the aggregate ost urve remains onstant as the number of rms is hanged.
Thus, hanges in osts are not driving results.
The ontest suess funtion used is the ratio form. As pointed out by
Hirshleifer [20℄, this has the property that beause of the high marginal gain
from lobbying when total lobbying is near zero, a Nash equilibrium without
some level of wasteful lobbying annot exist. In the situation modelled here,
the agent that has 'the ear of the King' likely gets there way if there is nobody
else whispering. As suh, the ratio form is taken to be appropriate.
Identiation of equilibria was estimated through a bakward indution im-
plementation of numerial dynami programming (See for example 2). A ve-
tor of 50 disrete values was used for eah state variable, generating the value
funtion(s) at 50 spei points. Quadrati interpolation was used to approx-
imate value funtion levels between the spei points. As for the theoretial
development, symmetry was imposed on the rst order onditions to establish
equilibrium relations. To loate the Nash equilibrium, a searh was then used to
identify a pair of negotiation expenditures that mutually zeroed the respetive
relations. The derivatives x∗′t and y
∗′
t were numerially estimated by perturbing
the value of qt that dened the NE. The thus alulated derivatives were part
of the zero relation that dened the equilibrium qt level. This was iterated on
until the eulidean distane between value funtion vetors for suessive peri-
ods was less than 10−10 or the number of iterations exeeded 100. For the ase
omparisons, the onvergene threshold was 10−10, with a maximum number
of iterations at 40. In a large majority of ases, the onvergene threshold was
attained. However, some ases entered stable osillations in value funtion level.
These were terminated after the maximum number of iterations.
The analytial development foused on a single period, examining the in-
entives governing the amount of development in a period, and the amount of
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Figure 2: Optimal resoure use, for utility maximization ignoring prot, prot
maximization ignoring utility, and Hartwik style utility optimization, where
prots are invested into a apital stok that ontributes to household inome. All
urves exept that for Hartwik kt = 0 ase (grey) plot on left axis. Numerial
onvergene problems responsible for 'bumpiness'.
lobbying eort. The numerial results are illustrated by linking a sequene of
periods together, and examining the development paths, as well as expeted
total development, total lobbying, and time till development stops, as seen at
the start of the game. Figure 2 shows the state dependent resoure use funtion
for three alternative optimality onditions. If rm prots are ignored and only
household utility is maximized, then no development ours if zt is less than
8.3333, and for zt > 8.3333, it is optimal to hoose qt = zt−8.3333. In ontrast,
if household utility is ignored and the present value of the prot of a monopoly
owner maximized, all of the resoure is used. However, spreading osts leads to
a more gradual development path over time. Prior to any development, zt = w,
where, in this ase, w = 50.
A third optimization is the Hartwik style ase, where returns from invested
prot are added to household inome. When zt is small, there is more develop-
ment than with a monopolist, as that development inreases ommunity popula-
tion and aggregate utility. However, development falls more rapidly hitting the
zt axis oinidentally lose to the point where aggregate utility is maximized.
As zt falls, kt inreases, inreasing household inome, and the marginal value
of the (normal) publi good. Relative to the path where apital aumulation
begins when zt = w, that for apital aumulation beginning later is uniformly
higher, and development is halted with a smaller zt value. Without any apital,
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it is worth undertaking some additional development to build it up.
Although not explored in detail, the optimality question highlights an im-
portant aspet of deentralization. Even if full ownership of the resoure is
provided to a ommunity, there is no guarantee that the environment will fare
better. If loals are able to apture the benets of development, they may hoose
more development. Two features of the urrent model would lead to suh an
eet. First, if the benets of development are large, relative to the loal value
of the publi good, then greater development is likely. Seond, if loal inome
is low, making the marginal value of the inome ontribution of development
large, then greater development is likely. If the resoure in question has large
aggregate value beyond the loal ommunity, deentralizing ontrol to the loal
level may be worse for aggregate welfare than maintaining entral ontrol.
For omparison purposes, prot maximizing resoure use and rm value are
shown in gure 3. Not surprisingly, rm prot is inreasing in the amount of
resoure remaining. The impat of hanging the probability is also onsistent
with expetations, in that the greater the probability that the resoure will be
available for use next period, the more of the resoure rms are willing to leave
to next period. What is more interesting is the fat that the value funtion is
not onave. Rather, when there is more than one rm, it is pieewise onave.
This is a onsequene of the interation between the disrete time nature of the
optimization and the prisoner's dilemma game that the rms are engaged in.
Disrete time implies that ations take plae at preise points in time. Here,
a spei quantity of resoure is used in eah period, with all the remaining
resoure used up in some nal period. One therefore does not have a smooth
onsumption path over time, but a sequene of distint quantities. This is
responsible for the kinks or disontinuities in the urves.
The prisoner's dilemma between imperfetly ompetitive rms, in this ase,
has the rms using more than the optimal amount of the resoure, as they aim
to apture it before their rival does. In panel (b), this manifests itself in the
fat that the point at whih the industry no longer onsumes all of the resoure
in the rst period ours for a larger zt the greater the number of rms. This is
marked by the point where the resoure use urve rst has a kink. For the rst
segment after the kink, the remainder of the resoure is onsumed in the seond
period. However, onerns about being 'beat' to the resoure in the rst period
are no longer drivers. As zt is inreased, a point is reahed where the rms
no longer use all the remaining resoure in the seond period. This produes
a downward shift in the optimal resoure use, a onsequene of the drop in
the slope of the value funtion. The quadrati interpolation used smoothed
the kink in the value funtion that orresponds to the hange in resoure use,
distorting the graph somewhat. In panel (a), for the pi = 0.0 ase, the value
funtion did not onverge, but rather entered a ylial pattern for two of the
50 zt levels, represented by the sawtooth just below zt = 40. As the probability
that development will take plae next period inreases, panel (a), the distane
between the slope hanges and between the disontinuities delines, and the size
of the downward steps inreases.
Figure 4 illustrates the impat of hanging the eetiveness of negotiating
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Figure 3: Resoure use and rm value as funtions of resoure remaining unused.
Panels (a) and (b) show the amount of the resoure used in the urrent period,
given the amount remaining. Panels () and (d) report the value of the value
funtion, whih is the present value of the optimal path from the urrent date
forward. In panels (a) and (), grey segment for pi = 1.0 indiates alternate
resoure use and value funtion for value funtion yle. In panel (d), grey lines
mark total industry value, while blak lines mark individual rm value.
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eort (ax and ay) and the responsiveness of the regulator (bx and by). Inreasing
the eetiveness orresponds to making it easier for stakeholders to engage in
negotiation, as the eterus paribus impat of more negotiation eort is greater.
Inreasing the regulator responsiveness (reduing bx and by) redues the strength
of the regulator's bias. Results are all based on an initial publi good level z0 =
w. The graphs show the expeted number of periods during whih development
of the resoure takes plae, expeted publi good level when development ends,
and present value of industry and household expenditures on negotiation eort.
All results are relative to the monopolist ase with ax = ay = 1 and bx = by = 1.
Panels a, , and e show the impat of hanging the eetiveness of negotiation
eort. Inreasing the size of ai inreases the impat of additional expenditures
on negotiation eort for agent type i. Inreasing the eetiveness of industry
lobbying inreases the duration of development ativity and redues the ex-
peted nal publi good level, for eah industry onentration level. Inreasing
rm numbers tends to redue the duration of development, while inreasing the
expeted nal publi good level. Two free riding eets ontribute to this. First,
with more rms, eah seeks to free ride on the others lobbying eort. Seond, the
open aess nature of the resoure rights results in inreasing development eah
period. Taken together, household lobbying inreases more rapidly in response
to faster development, and rms are unable to oordinate on ounterating it.
Negotiation eorts follow a more interesting pattern. When n = 4, household
eort is greatest when the eetiveness levels are approximately equal. This
eort is suient to overpower the industry lobbying eort, proteting a fairly
high level of the publi good. Inreasing the eetiveness of the household
lobbying inreases the expeted nal publi good level and redues the Nash
equilibrium negotiation eorts. Likewise, reduing household negotiation eort
eetiveness redues the NE negotiation eorts, and results in equilibria with
lower nal publi good levels. In the most extreme ase, there is almost no publi
good left, but rms take a long time to develop all the resoure. When n = 2,
the greatest household expenditure on lobbying takes plae when households
are somewhat more eetive than rms in their lobbying. Otherwise, the eets
are similar. When n = 1, there is evidene of a lobbying war. When ay is
somewhat larger than ax then both industry and household lobbying eorts
are high. However, there is not muh dierene in the outome than what is
observed with more than one rm.
When hanges in the responsiveness of the regulator are onsidered, expeted
nal publi good levels are generally inreasing with the number of rms, while
duration tends to deline. For any partiular number of rms, both duration
and expeted nal publi good level are not very responsive to hanges in bx
and by. This is somewhat surprising, sine the regulator's default (absent lobby-
ing) probability of ending further development ranges from approximately 0.01
(0.1/10.1) to approximately 0.99 (10.0/10.1). The industry and the households
respond in suh a way that the bias is oset. Notie that as the bias shifts
to favour one type of player - inreasing bx favours rms - negotiation eort
from that type of player falls. This ours for both player types, but is more
pronouned for the households. The free riding eet on industry negotiation
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Figure 4: Expeted duration (T ), expeted nal publi good level (z), expe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PV of rm (x) and household (y) negotiation eort, for various expenditure
eetiveness and regulator responsiveness and z0 = w. Radius of 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ase for
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 good level.
14
eort is partiularly evident here, eort falls as the number of rms inreases.
Eorts to inrease stakeholder engagement are analogous to hanging ef-
fetiveness and responsiveness. Changing responsiveness has almost no impat
on expeted time to development essation, nor on expeted remaining publi
good. Responsiveness is analogous to a regulator ontribution to lobbying ef-
fort, substituting for household or rm lobbying eort and leaving the outome
unhanged. It does not hange the marginal value of lobbying, and therefore
does not enourage muh of a hange. In ontrast, hanging eetiveness does
hange the marginal impat. What stands out here is that symmetri hanges
in eetiveness, suh as a regulator opening the proess in an equal way to all
stakeholders, does almost nothing to hange the outome. The outome is only
hanged if engagement favours one party. However, even then it may result in a
large inrease in expeted lobbying and a move away from the eient level of
the publi good. Inreasing stakeholder engagement may have little impat on
outomes, and might even make things worse. Thus, while priniples of good
governane may be onsistent with inreasing partiipation, it is far from ertain
that it will improve the eonomi eieny of the outomes.
Figure 5 shows the eet of hanging the utility funtion parameters and one
demand funtion parameter. When hanging the utility funtion, the elastiity
parameters were restrited to satisfy α + β = 1. In panels (a) through (),
the expeted nal publi good level inreases as both α and Yi are inreased,
while duration falls. This is a onsequene of the fat that inreasing α and
inreasing Yi eah inrease the marginal utility of the publi good relative to
residual inome. Thus, the marginal benet of lobbying inreases, leading to
an inrease in this ativity by the households. Inreasing rm numbers redues
lobbying or negotiation eort by the rms. However, the response patterns
dier for eah industry onentration level. When development is monopolized,
the rm responds to inreased household lobbing by inreasing its own lobbying
eort. For the lower α and Yi levels, this eet is also present for the oligopolisti
industry. However, when α = 0.5 and Yi = 50, industry lobbying eort has fallen
relative to the ases where α = 0.25 and Yi = 50 or α = 0.5 and Yi = 10. For all
ases in panel (b), household lobbying eort is greater than in panel (a). Free
riding by the rms inreases the marginal produtivity of household lobbying
eort, whih for large α and Yi is suessful in further driving down industry
lobbying. Although dominated by the free riding eet, in panel () industry
lobbying again falls for the highest α and Yi levels. For low α and Yi levels,
households inrease lobbying, relative to the n = 2 ase. However, the ability
of household lobbying to drive down industry lobbying is strong enough when α
and Yi are large that household lobbying atually falls relative to the n = 2 ase.
When the publi good is valuable enough to the households, and households have
enough inome, rms essentially apitulate in the lobbying game, whih then
redues the household's need to lobby. Not surprisingly, wealthy neighbourhoods
get their way at lower ost than less wealthy neighbourhoods.
An interation between the free riding eet on lobbying and the free riding
eet on development is also evident in panel (d). When γ is small, inreasing
n redues duration and inreases the nal publi good level. This is driven by
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free riding on lobbying eort. Redued lobbying by the industry is mathed by
inreased lobbying from households, leading to a shift in ontinuation probabili-
ties favouring the households. Thus, the expeted nal publi good level is here
inreasing in the number of rms. When γ = −0.5, rms essentially give up
on any development after the rst period. Consequently, they do not invest in
negotiation eort, making it unneessary for households to invest muh. Redu-
ing rm onentration now redues the nal publi good level, as with greater
onentration, rms redue rst period development to inrease rents aptured.
4 Disussion
Most alloation deisions around nite resoures are not made by an omnisient
regulator. In general, the regulator is inuened by the aeted parties, the
stakeholders, in some way. At one extreme, stakeholders may diretly or in-
diretly try to bribe the regulator. The unfavourable onnotation to the term
lobbying seems to reet this somewhat shady side of trying to inuene a reg-
ulator's deision. At present, in response to a widely held disillusionment with
the onventional proess, many are enouraging stakeholders to diretly engage
eah other. This proess may appear dierent, but fundamentally it still re-
quires stakeholders to expend resoures in an eort to inuene the resoure
management deision in their favour. Now, rather than diretly buying favours,
they have to show that they are ooperating with other stakeholders in resolving
the resoure sharing onit.
Herein we have onsidered a simple model of a resoure management prob-
lem, where the management deision onsists of halting all further development
of the resoure. The resoure is both nite and durable, onsistent with land
or rights to an annual alloation of water. Both pro- and anti-development lob-
bies attempt to inuene the deision of a regulator with nal authority over
whether further development ours. Four outomes are identied, ases with
limited lobbying, those where the pro-development lobby overpowers the anti-
development lobby, the onverse, and a lobbying war. This latter ase is perhaps
the most disturbing, as it suggests that lobbying, whether as traditionally envi-
sioned, or now as 'stakeholder engagement' may have little impat on the nal
outome. As suh, lobbying is simply a waste of resoures, engaged in beause
partiipants are involved in a prisoner's dilemma. In partiular, if lobbying is
made easier for stakeholders to engage in by government failitating meetings
and other forms of interations, losses may be exaerbated. In the rst ase,
government spends money to lower the ost of involvement in the proess. The
redution in the marginal ost of inuening the regulator indues stakeholders
to spend more on this ativity. In the end, the outome may be no dierent,
but overall osts have inreased.
These results also suggest that ompensation payments for habitat prote-
tion may be sensitive to industry struture. The presene or absene of ompen-
sation has been shown to aet the rate of development, with unompensated
takings hastening development and full ompensation slowing it [5, 21, 35℄.
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Without ompensation, there may even be an inentive to destroy the publi
good value [22℄. Although ompensation is not the fous of our model, our
results do speak to this issue. In partiular, if the purpose of ompensation is
to pay rms the present value of the asset being taken, our results show that
industry struture an play an important role in determining the size of the
present value - the less onentrated the industry, the lower the payment. Thus,
although the monopolist may be the friend of the onservationist, in terms of the
rate of development, the monopolist does not let the onservationist o heaply
if development is to be halted.
The ineienies highlighted here are a onsequene of the lak of lear
property rights. In the ase of land, owners do not have an exlusive right to
deide how to use their property. The right to a partiular use - development -
must be ated upon before the regulator deides that enough suh rights have
been ated on. With land, suh 'takings' themselves typially lead to a set of
legal battles about whether or not the property owner did own a development
right - requiring ompensation - or not. For water, in ontrast, rights are typi-
ally usufrutory, and only alloated when a need is demonstrated. Thus, water
rights are not owned until development that an use it has taken plae. When
property rights to water are vested with the user, then arrangements suh as
leasing or purhase an protet publi values from instream ows. In both ases,
the key property right is essentially open aess. Clarity of the legal right to de-
velop property or to aess water, independent of when those uses our, would
redue the inentive problems analyzed in this paper.
The role of rm size also bears some reetion. As modelled, there are no
eonomies of sale related to development osts aptured by the rms. This
is likely a reasonable reetion of the onstrution industry, where the trades
(eletriians, plumbers, arpenters) are generally haraterized by a large num-
ber of small rms. The benets of size in the model ome from a redution
in free riding inentives both in lobbying and in the nal market. The urrent
trend towards relatively large developments, with multiple year development
plans, may be a means of pre-empting the lobbying proess. Firms are able to
seure their development rights before the oupants arrive, who may desire less
development. An interesting empirial analysis would be to searh for a rela-
tionship between development projet size (units, area, or years to build) and
per unit publi spae. If larger projets are pre-empting the lobbying proess,
then publi spae should be smaller.
5 Conlusion
A stylized land development industry whih onsumes a publi good generating
resoure (open spae, surfae water) is modelled interating with ommunity o-
upants in a lobbying game. Households and the industry are lobbying to aet
whether further development is allowed. Lobbying eort invested depends on
the relative power of the agents, with some ombinations resulting in a lobby-
ing war. Inreasing the eetiveness of lobbying, akin to reduing the marginal
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ost of partiipation in the planning proess, tends to have little impat on the
outome when both interests are aeted symmetrially. This suggests that the
urrently popular stakeholder engagement eorts may do little to hange out-
omes. If these initiatives are ostly to implement, and if they enourage greater
lobbying eort by the stakeholders, then they are wasteful. If it is known whih
aeted party is disproportionately powerless, then the eieny of the outome
an be improved by equalizing the power balane. However, in so doing, there is
the risk that a wasteful lobbying war an develop. Further, suh shifting of the
power balane presupposes that the regulator knows in whih diretion the e-
ient amount of development is, a possible problem. The results of this analysis
also suggest that trends towards larger development projets and onentrated
development rms may in part be a response to the threat of lobbying.
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